

# **OPERATIONS, TRAINING AND LEADERSHIP: A DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP?**

**A MONOGRAPH  
BY  
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

Operations, training and Leadership: A dynamic relationship? By MAJ James H. Moller, USA, 42 pages.

This monograph investigates and answers the research question, "Is there a dynamic relationship between the operations, training, and leadership constructs relative to the operational environment?" Additionally this monograph assesses and determines the effects a change in the operations construct will have on Army training and leadership constructs.

FM 100-1, *The Army*, states, "The US Army is a doctrine-based organization in a values-centered profession." Army forces provide a range of capabilities available to the National Command Authorities, and can be called upon to dominate military actions on land. The Army's operations, training, and leadership constructs have a close, inseparable, dynamic relationship that works in concert with each other. This relationship generates the capabilities necessary to keep the Army trained and ready to act decisively within the global operational environment.

FM 100-5, Operations must capture and explain the dynamic interaction between its operations, training and leadership constructs in such a way that Army forces can rapidly respond to any mission tasking. Army doctrine should expressively clarify the dynamics between operations, training, and leadership ensuring a clear understanding that when one construct shifts, the others must be assessed and if required, also shift to stay in balance with a comprehensive mission environment. The Army's operations construct must remain relevant to our nation's strategic policies. This requires an agile force that can seamlessly shift between military actions with little time for preparation. It requires leaders who are agile, understand the dynamism and key linkages between the operations, training, and leadership constructs, and can operate and focus training for success in an ambiguous environment. Such an understanding and focus will maintain the Army as a trained and ready force capable of responding to the needs of the nation.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

This monograph investigates and answers the research question, "Is there a dynamic relationship between the operations, training, and leadership constructs relative to the operational environment?" Additionally this monograph assesses and determines the effects a change in the operations construct will have on Army training and leadership constructs.

This study is relevant and timely as the Army undertakes an examination of its operations doctrine as expressed in FM 100-5, *Operations* scheduled to be published in the year 2000. The focus of this doctrinal examination is based on the question, "Should the doctrinal focus of FM 100-5 shift from a doctrine of prompt and sustained land combat to a comprehensive doctrine providing direction for all operations?"<sup>1</sup> The question and answer are important "because the answer will affect how the Army organizes, trains, and equips its forces for a broad range of tasks\* associated with peacetime engagement, crisis, major theater war, and general war."<sup>2</sup>

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\* For the purpose of this monograph a task is defined as a duty assigned to an individual or unit.

(source: FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, p.1-102)

FM 100-1, *The Army* states “The Army is a doctrine based organization in a values centered profession”<sup>3</sup>. To accomplish its missions\*, the Army relies on three fundamental constructs: operations, training, and leadership.<sup>4</sup> In February 1999 General Abrams, the TRADOC commander, described a “doctrinal triad” to the FM 100-5 working team that depicts the dynamic relationship between operations, training, and leadership, that captures the unique nature of Army operations (Figure 1).<sup>5</sup> By examining and defining each component of the Doctrinal Triad, determining what if any are the relationships between components, the effects on the training and leadership constructs can be identified when a shift in the operations construct occurs. This examination is necessary to highlight the unique nature of




Figure 1.

Army operations and the effects that a change in the operational doctrine has on

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\* For the purpose of this monograph a mission is defined as a task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. Normally expressed as who, what, when, where, and why that must be accomplished. (source: FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, p.1-102)

training and leadership.

This monograph answers the research question through a five-chapter process. The first chapter introduces, defines, and explains the concept of the “Doctrinal Triad” and its relevance to the Army. Chapter two researches and defines two components of the Triad: the mission environment, the operations construct and answers the question “Does FM 100-5, *Operations* furnish the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, material acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training?” Chapters three and four focuses on answering the question, “Will a shift in the operations construct from a prompt, sustained land combat focus to a more comprehensive doctrine that provides guidance for all Army operations require a change in the Training and/or Leadership constructs?” Chapter three defines and explains the training construct, examines the implications of a shift in the operational construct, and determines what changes in the training construct are required to support a shift in the operations construct. Chapter four defines and explains the leadership construct, examines the implications of a shift in the operational construct, and determines what changes in the leadership construct are required to support a shift in the operations construct. Chapter five reviews the analysis, establishes recommendations, and present conclusions based on my analysis. The monograph has three limitations. First, this monograph assumes that the FY 00 FM 100-5, *Operations* will shift from a prompt and sustained land combat focus to a more comprehensive doctrine providing direction throughout the range of



Army operations. Second, this monograph will only evaluate a change in the operations construct and the effects that change has on the training and leadership constructs. Lastly, with the exception of the FM 100-5 Concept Papers dealing with the Operations doctrine's shift in focus, all research will use current doctrinal publications as the basis of this monograph.

## CHAPTER 2

### OPERATIONS CONSTRUCT

This chapter examines the current security environment, defines the terms mission environment and operations construct, and answers the question “Does FM 100-5, *Operations* furnish the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, material acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training?” To accomplish this task the chapter first examines the contemporary security environment and then describes the US strategy to enhance its security and achieve national goals and objectives. Next it defines the term Army mission environment, establishes the link to the security environment and determines the source or basis of the Army mission environment. Lastly, the chapter defines the term Army operational construct and determines the source or basis of the Army operations construct and establishes the linkage to the mission environment.

#### *Security Environment*

This section examines the contemporary security environment, describes and defines the goals of the national security strategy, and summarizes the threats to US security.

“The United States now enjoys a secure and promising position in the world, because of its economic, technological, and military strengths.”<sup>6</sup> Our

economic system has benefited from the expansion of the world economy and its free flow of goods and capital to an extent that the nation is experiencing economic resurgence and sustained growth.<sup>7</sup> With the end of the Cold War our nation's survival and territory are not threatened now or in the foreseeable future. No global challenger or hostile alliance is on the horizon and our ability to maintain our military superiority and capability is not in doubt.<sup>8</sup> This change from a relative clear and stable bipolar cold war environment to the current complex and ambiguous environment no longer constrained by a fear of rapid escalation of world war between the US and USSR does not mean we are free of adversaries. "The world remains a dangerous and uncertain place, and the US will likely face a number of significant challenges between now and 2015."<sup>9</sup> The primary sources of these threats are:

1. Regional dangers that threaten US interest or allies or challenge the US militarily.
2. Proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies particularly the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
3. Transnational dangers that threaten the safety of US citizens and undermine alliances and US policies.
4. Protection of the homeland from strategic nuclear arsenals and weapons of mass destruction from nation states and non-state actors.


To maintain its secure and promising position in the world the United States has developed an integrated strategy using diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means of power. The latest strategy entitled *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* represents executive authoritative guidance to ensure the protection of our nation's fundamental and enduring needs. The guidance identifies US core objectives, identifies and gives examples of US interests, identifies threats to US objectives, provides a strategy to counter threats to US objectives and interests, and represents the US view of the contemporary security environment. The US core objectives stated in the 1998 National Security Strategy are:<sup>10</sup>

1. Protect the sovereignty, territory, and population of the US, and preventing and deterring threats to our homeland, including NBC attacks and terrorism.
2. Prevent the emergence of a hostile regional coalition or hegemony.
3. Ensure freedom of the seas and security of international sea lines of communication, airways and space.
4. Ensure uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies and strategic resources.
5. Deterring and, if necessary defeating aggression against US allies and friends.

## *Army Mission Environment*

This section defines and examines the term Army mission environment and establishes the link with the National Security Strategy.

The mission environment defines the range of tasks that Army forces prepare for and perform within joint, multinational, and interagency operations. The *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), *The National Military Strategy of the United States*



(NMS), and Title 10 of the *United States Code* (USC) are the three primary sources that form the basis of the Army's mission environment. (Figure 2)

*The Quadrennial Defense Review* represents the advice from the Secretary of the Defense to the President on an over-arching defense strategy to deal with the world today and tomorrow. This advice is based on an analysis of the NSS, a threat analysis which identifies current and future threats to U.S. national security, and a total review of the current military force capabilities and limitations, and identifies required military capabilities, and define programs and policies needed to support them.

The *National Military Strategy* (NMS) represents the advice of the

Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces in implementing the guidance in the President's *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* and the Secretary of Defense's *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*. The current objectives and goals of the NMS are as follows:<sup>11</sup>

1. Shape the International Environment by:
  - a. Promoting Regional Stability
  - b. Preventing or reducing conflicts and threats.
  - c. Deterring Aggression and coercion
2. Responding to the full spectrum of crisis by:
  - a. Deterring Aggression and coercion in crisis
  - b. Conducting smaller scale contingency (SSC) operations
  - c. Fighting and winning Major Theater Wars (MTW)
3. Preparing now for an uncertain future by:<sup>12</sup>
  - a. Pursuing a focused modernization effort in order to replace aging systems and incorporate cutting-edge technologies into the force to ensure continued U.S. military superiority over time.
  - b. Continue to exploit the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) in order to improve the U.S. military's ability to perform near-term missions and meet future challenges;

- c. Exploit the "Revolution in Business Affairs" (RBA) to radically reengineer DoD infrastructure and support activities;
- d. Insure or hedge against unlikely, but significant, future threats in order to manage risk in a resource-constrained environment and better position the Department to respond in a timely and effective manner to new threats as they emerge.

The NMS also identifies the military capabilities required to support the strategy:

1. Force structure not only to meet identified threats, but also have the capabilities necessary to succeed in a broad range of anticipated missions and operational environments.
2. U.S. forces, both active and Reserve, must be multi-mission capable, proficient in their core warfighting competencies, and able to transition from peacetime activities and operations to enhanced deterrence in crises, to war.
3. Balanced mix of overseas presence and power projection capabilities. Effective and efficient global power projection is the key to the flexibility demanded of our forces and ultimately provides our national leaders with more options in responding to potential crises and conflicts.

The last document that defines the mission environment for the Army is Title X, of the United States Code which states "it is intent of the Congress to

provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of.”<sup>13</sup>

1. “Preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;”<sup>14</sup>

2. “Supporting the national policies;”<sup>15</sup>

3. “Implementing the national objectives; and”<sup>16</sup>

4. “Overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.”<sup>17</sup>

Through Title X and its associated funding, Congress is able to a certain extent control the organization, force structure, and equipment procurement which indirect affects the mission and purpose of the Army.

### *Army Operations Construct*

This section defines and examines the term Army Operations Construct, which includes the role, purpose, and linkages as it applies to Army land forces.

The term Army Operations construct is defined as a condensed expression of how the US Army, as part of a joint team, intends to conduct operations during war and peace in support of the National Military Strategy. This expression is authoritative, but requires judgement in its application and must be uniformly known and understood and accepted.



The purpose of the Army operations construct is to:

1. Establish a shared professional culture and operational approach.
2. Serves as a basis for curriculum in the Army school system.
3. Sets the direction for modernization
4. Sets the standard for leadership development and soldier training.

To be uniformly accepted and relevant the Army Operations Construct must:

1. Be able to accommodate a wide variety of threats.
2. Be relevant to rapidly changing requirements.
3. Reflect new technology and potential future
4. Account for resources and force dispositions (force projection versus forward deployment)

Three primary sources serve as the foundation for the Army's Operations construct; joint doctrine, FM 100-1, *The Army*, and conclusions and lessons learned from actual operations and experiments. Joint Doctrine represents authoritative guidance for the joint employment of the armed forces. Though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. Joint doctrine provides the national position for combined doctrine development consistent with the contemporary security environment.

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* provides fundamental principles and doctrine for the conduct of joint and multinational operations. This publication sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, as well as the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in Multi-national and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their service doctrine and appropriate plans. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. Joint doctrine is the foundation for unified action of the armed forces which actions synchronizes joint operations and single service operations in time, space and purpose to accomplish national objectives and goals.

“FM 100-1, *The Army* expresses the Army’s fundamental purposes, roles, responsibilities and functions, as established by the Constitution, Congress, and the Department of the Defense”.<sup>18</sup> FM 100-1 defines the broad enduring purposes for which the Army was established and the qualities, values and traditions that guide the Army in protecting and serving the nation and provides a foundation for the Army’s basic operational doctrine, expressed in FM 100-5, *Operations*.<sup>19</sup> “All other Army doctrine flows from the principles and precepts contained in this manual.”<sup>20</sup>

Lessons learned from operations and warfighting experiments in the past decade have also shape the operations construct. Recent operations such as

operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia and Uphold Democracy in Haiti are recent examples of operations that have provided feedback in the form of lessons learned that have been incorporated into doctrine or training. Force XXI Army Warfighting Experiment (AWE) was used as a means for the Army to identify and test concepts and requirements for new doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel and soldier systems. Results from this experiment are being used today to validate equipment, manning and force structure requirements.

The Army's Operational Construct is expressed in FM 100-5, *Operations* and is the Army's guide to actions throughout the mission environment and range of military operations as described in the National Military Strategy. This manual represents the Army's understanding of contemporary security environment; it explains how the Army plans to conduct major operations in concert with joint, multinational and or interagency organizations, and links the Army to the National Military Strategy.

#### *Future Operations Construct*

To remain relevant to meet the needs as expressed in the US security strategy and the National Military Strategy the US Army is considering adopting a comprehensive operations construct. These forces would have increased situational awareness, information dominance, and capable of decisive maneuver and precision engagement.


The comprehensive operations construct envisions land operations

comprising of four military actions: Offense, Defense, Stability and Support (ODSS). These actions could occur simultaneously or separately throughout the mission environment and are complementary to each other. For example, a unit whose primary mission is to conduct sustained offensive operations may, based on mission analysis have the supporting military actions of defense, stability, and support to enable the unit to conduct its primary mission. The operations construct provides the focus and doctrinal linkages between the military actions of ODSS and the training and leadership constructs.

### *Summary*

The United States faces a dynamic and uncertain security environment complicated by two diverging trends. The first is toward democratic states and free markets, which favors the United States and its interests and goals. This trend is evident in the growth of democracy in Latin America and parts of the former Soviet Union, and in the economies of the Pacific Rim. The other trend is toward global disintegration, which is unfavorable, and a possible threat to the United States and its goals and interests. This trend is characterized by a breakdown of the authority of nation states and international bodies, a widening of social and economic differences, and by the degeneration of traditional societal mores caused by resource depletion, rapid population growth, environmental damage, and uncontrolled refugee migration. These factors have fueled the emergence of ethnic, religious and cultural hatreds and the acceptance of violence as a means to resolve issues.

The National Security Strategy, The Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Military Strategy, USC, joint doctrine, FM 100-1, and lessons learned from operations and experiments all contribute and define the Army mission environment and the tasks that Army land forces will conduct. (Figure 3) The Army Operations construct is articulated in FM 100-5, *Operations* which describes how the Army thinks about the conduct



of major operations, battles, and engagements in war and peace. It applies to the Total Army, active and reserve components as well as Army civilians. Finally FM 100-5 furnishes the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, material acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training.<sup>21</sup>

## CHAPTER 3

### TRAINING CONSTRUCT

*"Training is more than today's readiness....Training puts doctrine into practice.... Training today is the link to tomorrow's battle."*<sup>22</sup>

GENERAL GORDON R. SULLIVAN  
United States Army Chief of Staff  
June 1991-June 1995

This chapter examines current army training doctrine, and answers the question will a shift in the operations construct from a prompt, sustained land combat focus to a more comprehensive doctrine require a change in the training construct? To accomplish this task it first defines the term training construct and then examines the current Army training doctrine. Lastly, this chapter examines the implications of a shift in the operational construct, and determines what changes in the training construct are required to support this shift.

#### *Training Construct*

"The Army exists to deter war or, if deterrence fails, to reestablish peace through victory in combat wherever US interests are challenged".<sup>23</sup> This objective requires an Army that is capable and trained to mobilize, deploy, fight, and sustain combat operations in joint, multinational, or interagency operations. The Army training construct is the model used to prepare and produces soldiers

“who are proficient in battlefield skills, disciplined, physically tough, and highly motivated”.<sup>24</sup> The Army’s doctrinal training construct expressed in FM 25-100, *Training the Force* provides the necessary guidelines on how to plan, execute, and assess Army training for individuals, leaders, and units at all levels.

The US seeks to achieve its strategic goals and objectives in three diverse environments; peace, conflict and war. The Army has grouped these three environments into two categories; war and operations other than war (OOTW), which incorporates the environments of peace and conflict.<sup>25</sup> To meet mission requirements throughout a range of environments, the Army conducts operations as a “Total Force” which is an integration of active duty, reserve component, and civilians working in concert to achieve objectives and goals.<sup>26</sup> The Army training construct must account for the range of environments in which Army forces operate as well as the differences in units, equipment, geographic location, and training opportunities. To account for these differences, the Army training construct is based on nine principals of training and the concept of Battle Focus.

The Army training mission is to prepare soldiers leaders and units to deploy, fight, and win in combat. The principles of training describe the characteristics of Army training that allow a unit to meet the Army training mission.

- Train as combined arms and services team.<sup>27</sup>

The Army operational construct requires that each unit must be prepared to execute joint, multinational, and interagency without additional training or

lengthy adjustment periods. Proficiency develops when teams train together.

Peacetime training and command relationships must mirror wartime task organization to the greatest extent possible.

- Train as you fight.<sup>28</sup>

The goal of Army training is to develop units and organizations that can successfully operate and sustain combat-level performance throughout the Army mission environment. Within the realm of safety and common sense, leaders must demand and develop training conditions which simulate the combat environment which includes firing weapons, maneuvering as a combined arms, and training with joint, multinational, and interagency organizations.

- Use appropriate doctrine.<sup>29</sup>

The Army training construct is based on, and must conform to the Army operations construct. "FM 100-5, *Operations*, and supporting doctrinal manuals describe common procedures and operational methods that permit commanders and organizations to adjust rapidly to changing situations".<sup>30</sup> Doctrine also facilitates communications by providing a basis for a common vocabulary and for military literacy across the force.

- Use performance oriented training.<sup>31</sup>

Individuals, leaders, and units become proficient in the performance of critical tasks and missions through practice. Soldiers learn best by doing, using a hands-on approach that defines the task, describes the conditions under which the task must be completed, and details the standards of performance.



- Train to challenge.<sup>32</sup>

“Tough, realistic, and intellectually and physically challenging training both excites and motivates soldiers and leaders”.<sup>33</sup>

- Train to sustain proficiency.<sup>34</sup>

Once individuals, units, and leaders are trained to standard; the training strategy must incorporate collective and individual training plans to repeat critical task training to maintain proficiency.

- Train using multi-echelon techniques.<sup>35</sup>

Training individuals, leaders, and units simultaneously is the most efficient way of training and sustaining a diverse number of mission essential tasks within limited training opportunities.

- Train to maintain.<sup>36</sup>

Maintenance is a vital part of every training program. Maintenance training is designed to keep equipment and personnel in a high state of readiness in support of training or combat employment.

- Make commanders the primary trainers.<sup>37</sup>

Leaders are responsible for the training, performance, and evaluation of their soldiers and units. “To accomplish their training responsibility, commanders must.”<sup>38</sup>

1. Base training on wartime mission requirements.
2. Identify applicable Army standards.
3. Assess current levels of proficiency.

4. Provide the required resources.
5. Develop and execute training plans that result in proficient individuals, leaders and units.

Battle Focus is a training concept that links wartime missions to Army training requirements and plans. This concept is based on the premise that individuals, leaders, and units cannot train and maintain proficiency on all Army tasks. Unit commanders identify critical tasks based on the organizations' wartime mission, which in turn provides focus for the unit training program.

The training management approach to implement the battle focus concept has four steps:

1. Mission essential task list (METL) development. The mission essential task list contains those tasks designated as mission essential in accomplishing the unit's wartime mission. War plans and external directives such as mission training plans, mobilization plans, and force integration plans provide the battle focus by which the commander conducts his analysis in determining the units METL. A unit's METL forms the basis and focus of a unit's training program.<sup>39</sup>
2. Training planning. Training planning is the linkage between a unit's battle focus and METL to a systematic training approach to ensure that units are capable of performing their wartime mission. Training planning begins with an assessment of a unit's current level of proficiency and compares that level against the desired level of proficiency. The

commander, based on that assessment, publishes his training guidance, which details his training vision, goal and priorities. This guidance forms the basis of long range, short range, and near term training plans.<sup>40</sup>

3. Training execution. All Army training regardless of the specific collective and individual tasks being trained has the following execution requirements. Adequate preparation by trainers coupled with an effective presentation which includes hands on soldier practice, followed by an evaluation and re-training if required. Leaders must observe and evaluate training, provide guidance and direct changes that leads to units trained and ready to execute their wartime mission.<sup>41</sup>

4. Training assessment. "Evaluation of training measures the demonstrated ability of individuals, leaders, and units against specific training standards".<sup>42</sup> A critical component of training assessment is the after action review (AAR). An AAR is a structured review process that allows training participants to discover for themselves what happened, why it happened, and how it can be done better. The purpose of the AAR is to provide direct feedback into the training plan by establishing what happened, what went right or wrong, and how should the task be done next time.<sup>43</sup>

#### *Future Training Requirements*

The Army's training methodology must be directly linked to its operations concept. The methodology must training soldiers and units not only for

warfighting tasks and skills but those activities associated with peace and adoption of a comprehensive operations doctrine. Tough, realistic, and demanding training focused on a Mission Essential Task List (METL) that allows a decisive, earlier execution of the Army's operations concept throughout the range of the mission environment will continue to be the basis of the Army training construct.

The uncertain and shifting security environment and the new operations concept of ODSS will not change the Army training construct. Rather, the change in training will be a conceptual or cultural shift within the Army that accepts the expanded mission environment defined in the nation's strategic documents and embraced within the Army's operational concept of ODSS. The Army can no longer afford to train and develop its leaders to focus solely on offensive or defensive operations in a conventional war at the expense of preparation for the other two dimensions of ODSS. We must now train our units to be decisive *earlier* in a balanced fashion within the framework of ODSS in support of national strategic policies and objectives.

Strategic requirements, war plans and external directives will continue to provide the focus for Army forces. The primary mission of the Army is warfighting and deterring war. This mission has an associated training concept of battle focused training. The emergence and growing importance of those non-warfighting missions and tasks associated with the end of the cold war may require a change in how leaders develop the unit's METL to account for those

missions the Army conducts to support the National Security Strategy of engagement a daily basis. This change will require leaders to identify and prioritize missions and develop the METL as in the past, however, training must strike a balance between all four dimensions of ODSS. Commanders through the METL development process identify the proper mix of military actions (ODSS) and associated tasks that are required for success in accomplishing their primary mission as well as their peacetime engagement mission. Change of mission or a contingency operation may shift mission focus and require an adjustment on the emphasis of military actions. The commander, based on the units training level will determine the required changes, re-focus the unit's training, and conduct mission-focused rehearsals to accomplish the change in mission. The real essence of training management is assessing the units training level, understanding and accounting for the wealth of training and experience the conduct of operations brings, and which competencies and tasks are applicable across a change of mission. For example, a unit that is conducting stability actions as part of a contingency mission tasking is also executing logistical tasks. If the unit's next mission were an offensive action, it would not require training for those logistics tasks. Instead, it could use that competency as a source of agility and focus its training on other offensive tasks. As a result, time for retraining can be minimized and the unit can switch between missions quickly and be decisive earlier. To effectively train and prepare a unit to seamlessly shift between the actions of ODSS, leaders must understand what previous training and preparation

is applicable to the new situation, develop training or mission guidance to prepare the force for the new situation, and then successfully execute it. The key to readiness is agility in training and leadership.

The bottomline is that the Army, while employed in either peacetime engagement, training at home station, or conducting combat operations, must develop the agility to move promptly between offense, defense, stability, and support to reduce employment preparation time and meet the requirement of national strategic policy to be decisive earlier. We must understand that readiness, as defined today, requires a force trained and prepared to execute a broad range of missions within ODSS. The key to preparing for this broad range is agility in training and leadership.

### *Summary*

The training construct establishes how Army forces train to conduct land operations in the contemporary operational environment. The Army's needs a standardized training doctrine applicable throughout the force that addresses the range of army land operations based on the contemporary security environment. It must provide the necessary guidelines on how to plan, execute, and assess training at all levels with joint, multinational, and interagency organizations. Additionally it must account for the differences in training digital and analog units as we transition and modernize our force structure. The current operational environment requires agile and adaptive units able to shift mission focus rapidly to meet the demands placed on Army forces. The training construct provides the

guidelines on how to determine the mission essential tasks, assess the units current training level, determine which competencies and tasks are applicable across a change of mission, and what tasks require training. This process allows Army land forces to react quickly and remain relevant in rapidly changing situations.

## CHAPTER 4

### LEADERSHIP CONSTRUCT

*"Well led, properly trained, motivated, and inspired soldiers will accomplish any mission."*<sup>44</sup>

*FM 22-100, Leadership*

This chapter examines the Army leadership doctrine and answers the question will a shift in the operations construct from a prompt, sustained land combat focus to a more comprehensive doctrine require a change in the leadership construct? To accomplish this task it first defines the term leadership construct and then examines the changes in the leadership construct-taking place as this monograph is being written. Next, this chapter examines the implications of a shift in the operational construct, and determines what changes in the leadership construct are required to support this shift.

#### *The Leadership Construct*

"The battlefield challenge is to inspire soldiers to do things against their natural will, to carry out missions for the greater good of the unit, the Army, and the country."<sup>45</sup> Soldiers, leaders, and units perform difficult tasks, often under dangerous, stressful circumstances as they execute assigned missions.

Leadership, as defined by FM 22-100, *Leadership* "is influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization".<sup>46</sup> Influencing means motivating soldiers



to accomplish the mission or improve the organization.<sup>47</sup> Purpose answers the “why” a soldier should do difficult things under dangerous, stressful circumstances.<sup>48</sup> Direction provides focus and priority of effort for soldiers and units as they execute their mission.<sup>49</sup> Motivation provides incentive for soldiers achieve their potential and use their initiative when they see the need for action.<sup>50</sup> The Army leadership construct provides a foundation for the development of leaders of character and competence at the direct, organizational, and strategic level and provides points for leaders to consider when assessing and developing soldiers and units to execute a broad range of tasks through a comprehensive operations construct and mission focused training construct.

### *Requirements of Army Leaders*

As the Army considers adopting a comprehensive operations construct, it is simultaneously analyzing and considering changing its leadership construct. TRADOC Pam 525-5, *Force XXI Operations* describes the conceptual foundations for the conduct of war and operations in the early twenty-first century and the role of the US Army. The following describes the Army vision of leadership as described in TRADOC Pam 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*:

1. “The Army’s future leaders will be fundamentally competent and have the necessary intuitive sense of operational units and soldiers.”<sup>51</sup>
2. “Leaders will have a keen awareness of the world and know the role of military force in that world.”<sup>52</sup>

3. "Leaders will exploit the potential to be found in military organizations that are flatter, internettted, and where quality soldiers with expanded and timely information are able to reach their full potential for initiative and action within the overall intent when given that opportunity."<sup>53</sup>
4. "Leaders will be schooled in joint, multinational operations and skilled in synchronizing and harmonizing all aspects of combat and noncombat operations."<sup>54</sup>
5. "Future leaders will have a higher level of doctrine based skills, knowledge, attitudes and experience to apply battlefield operating systems to a wider range of complex contingency missions. Institutions and commanders will train and develop leaders who are intuitive, agile minded, innovative, and disciplined."<sup>55</sup>

#### *Army Leadership Construct*

The complex and ambiguous mission environment requires leaders that quickly grasp changes in situations and conditions, exercise initiative by independently planning and execute doctrine-based actions that maintain a steady focus on accomplishing the assigned operational mission. FM 22-100, *Leadership* addresses these requirements by providing a unified theory of Army Leadership and leadership doctrine for the Total Army. Army leadership doctrine addresses what makes a leader of character and competence to meet Army mission requirements from now and into the twenty-first century.<sup>56</sup> The goal of

the leadership construct is to develop Army leaders who:<sup>57</sup>

1. Live up to the Army values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage.
2. Develop the required interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills.
3. Influence their organizations by providing purpose, direction and motivation.
4. Operate effectively to achieve mission accomplishment through sound planning and preparing, aggressive execution, and continuous assessment.
5. Improve the Army by developing its people, building teams and organizations, and learning both as individuals and collectively as groups.
6. Exercise initiative in diverse, complex environments.

The Army is a values based organization. This purpose of Army leadership doctrine is to define and focus those values. Leaders establish standards, lead by example, do what is legally, ethically and morally correct, and guide and influence others to do the same; peers and soldiers alike. Leaders establish and maintain an environment that promotes training and learning while ensuring soldiers are treated with dignity and respect. The bottomline is that good leadership produces America's Army through the execution of the Army's operations and training constructs; a trained and ready force prepared to fight and win the nations wars led by leaders of character.

The framework by which the Army develops leaders of competence and

character is expressed within seven values, three attributes, four skills and four actions overlaid by the leadership slogan Be, Know, Do. Be, Know, Do is the Army leadership slogan that identifies and highlights the characteristics of an Army leader and what leaders ascribe to. Seven values and three attributes are used to describe the character of a leader and what he must be:

Values: describe principles or standards considered desirable or worthwhile in Army leaders:

1. Loyalty – “Bear true faith and allegiance to the US constitution, the Army, your unit, and other soldiers.”<sup>58</sup>
2. Duty – “Fulfill your obligations.”<sup>59</sup>
3. Respect – “Treat people as they should be treated.”<sup>60</sup>
4. Selfless service – “Put welfare of the nation, the Army, and subordinates before your own.”<sup>61</sup>
5. Honor – “Live up to all the Army values.”<sup>62</sup>
6. Integrity – “Do what’s right both legally and morally.”<sup>63</sup>
7. Professional courage – “Face fear, danger, or adversity both physical or moral.”<sup>64</sup>

Attributes – are fundamental qualities and characteristics that are inherent or ascribed to by Army leaders:

1. Mental – Those mental attributes of a leader relating to the intellect or the mind including will, self-discipline, initiative, judgement, self-confidence, intelligence, and cultural awareness<sup>65</sup>

2. Physical – Those attribute attributes of a leader relating to the physical body and appearance of a leader including health, physical fitness, military and professional bearing.<sup>66</sup>

3. Emotional – Those attributes of the consciousness or feelings of a leader that describe self-control, balance and stability or those attributes that contribute to how you feel and how you interact with others.<sup>67</sup>

Competence is a single word that describes what a leader must “know”.

Four categories of competence describe what a leader must know:

1. Interpersonal Skills – coaching, motivating and empowering.<sup>68</sup>
2. Conceptual skills – enable you to handle ideas. They require sound judgement as well as the ability to think creatively and reason analytically, critically and ethically.<sup>69</sup>
3. Technical skills – are job-related skills that allow leaders to accomplish all assigned tasks.<sup>70</sup>
4. Tactical skills – deal with the arrangement of forces and capabilities on the battlefield to solve tactical problems<sup>71</sup>

Leadership is a single word that describes what a leader must “do”. Three leader actions describe what a leader must do:

1. Influencing – soldiers and units to accomplish the mission by communicating, making sound decisions and motivating soldiers.<sup>72</sup>
2. Operating: The short term things you do to accomplish a mission on time and to standard.<sup>73</sup>

3. Improving: The teaching, mentoring, and coaching activities a leader does to make the unit better tomorrow.<sup>74</sup>

#### *Implications of a Shift in the Operations Construct*

The leadership construct highlights the qualities that enable soldiers to lead Army forces within the range of military actions. Army leadership is the dynamic that guides and directs the training necessary to achieve success and lead forces in the conduct of missions. The Army needs a leadership doctrine that develops imaginative and adaptive leaders capable of developing solutions to complex and unique problems during training and mission execution. Leaders must develop the agility required for successful execution of a variety of tasks within the framework of the operational environment often on a short-notice basis with little time for detailed preparation.

To do this, leaders must understand the operational environment, draw from the operations construct the appropriate doctrine, understand what previous training and preparation is applicable to the new situation, train and orient the force on the new situation, and then successfully execute the mission.

To execute missions successfully in the current operations environment, the Army needs leaders who understand the security and mission environments, and the operations construct of ODSS. These leaders must be imaginative in developing solutions to complex and unique problems during training and mission execution. They must understand that the intangible quality of unit cohesion, that results from long periods of working together in one mission environment, can be

leveraged to quickly prepare a unit for another mission environment. Leadership is the dynamic that “focuses” the capabilities inherent in the relationship between the operations, leadership, and training constructs and focuses it, through METL training, to produce units capable of executing their tasks within the mission environment.

Leaders must develop the agility required for successful execution of a variety of tasks within the framework of the mission environment often on a short-notice basis with little time for detailed preparation. The real essence of the art of leadership is the ability of leaders to shift seamlessly, whether in training or in execution, to changing environments or missions. To do this, leaders must understand what previous training and preparation is applicable to the new situation, develop training or mission guidance to orient the force on the new situation, and then successfully execute it.

### *Summary*

The contemporary security environment is complex and ambiguous. To meet this challenge the Army requires versatile and adaptable leaders who understand the environment and can shift mission focus with little or no notice. The Army leadership construct provides a foundation for the development of leaders of character and competence at the direct, organizational, and strategic level and provides points for leaders to consider when assessing and developing soldiers, and units to execute a broad range of tasks through a comprehensive operations construct and mission focused training construct.

Leadership is the dynamic that “focuses” the capabilities inherent in the relationship between the operations, leadership, and training constructs and focuses it, through METL training, to produce units capable of executing their tasks within the mission environment.



## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

This chapter summarizes the analysis, presents recommendations, and establishes a conclusion on the dynamic relationship between the operations, training and leadership constructs.

#### *Summary*

This monograph investigates and answers the research question, Is there a dynamic relationship between the operations, training, and leadership constructs relative to the operational environment. Additionally this monograph assesses and determines the effects a change in the operations construct will have on Army training and leadership constructs.

Through an analysis of the operations, training and leadership constructs the following conclusions are made:

1. Operations Construct
  - a. "The United States now enjoys a secure and promising position in the world, because of its economic, technological, and military strengths."<sup>75</sup>
  - b. "The world remains a dangerous and uncertain place, and the US will likely face a number of significant challenges between now and 2015."<sup>76</sup>

c. The five primary US core security objectives as stated in the 1998 National Security Strategy are:<sup>77</sup>

- 1) Protect the sovereignty, territory, and population of the US, and preventing and deterring threats to our homeland, including NBC attacks and terrorism.
- 2) Prevent the emergence of a hostile regional coalition or hegemony.
- 3) Ensure freedom of the seas and security of international sea lines of communication, airways and space.
- 4) Ensure uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies and strategic resources.
- 5) Deterring and, if necessary defeating aggression against US allies and friends.

d. Three primary sources link the US National Security Strategy with the Armed Forces and ultimately the US Army.

- 1) The *National Military Strategy* (NMS) represents the advice of the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces in implementing the guidance in the President's *A National Security Strategy*.
- 2) Title 10, USC is a legislative document which details the organization, functions and responsibilities of the Armed services including the US Army.

3) The Quadrennial Defense Review represents the advice from the Secretary of the Defense to the President on an over-arching defense strategy to deal with the world today and tomorrow.

e. The Army's Operational Construct is expressed in FM 100-5, *Operations* and is the Army's guide to actions throughout the mission environment and range of military operations as described in the National Military Strategy. This manual represents the Army's understanding of contemporary security environment; it explains how the Army plans to conduct major operations in concert with joint, multinational and or interagency organizations, and links the Army to the National Military Strategy. Three primary sources link the US Army's operations construct with National Military Strategy.

1) Joint Doctrine represents authoritative guidance for the joint employment of the armed forces. Though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. These documents link the US Army to the National Military Strategy.

2) "FM 100-1, *The Army* expresses the Army's fundamental purposes, roles, responsibilities and functions, as established by the Constitution, Congress, and the Department of the Defense".<sup>78</sup>  
This document links joint doctrine to the Army's operation

construct.

3) Lessons learned from operations and experiments provide means for the Army to identify and test concepts and requirements for new doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel and soldier systems. Results from this experiment are being used today to validate equipment, manning and force structure requirements.

## 2. Training Construct

a. The current operational environment requires agile and adaptive units able to shift mission focus rapidly to meet the demands placed on Army forces.

b. The Army training construct is the model used to prepare and produces soldiers “who are proficient in battlefield skills, disciplined, physically tough, and highly motivated”.<sup>79</sup>

c. The goal of the training construct is an Army that is capable and trained to mobilize, deploy, fight, and sustain combat operations in joint, multinational, or interagency operations.

d. Battle Focus is a training concept that links wartime missions to Army training requirements and plans.

e. Tough, realistic, and demanding training that focuses on a Mission Essential Task List (METL) that allows a decisive, earlier execution of the Army’s operations concept throughout the range of the

mission environment.

f. The Battle Focus and METL training link directly back to the operations concept.

g. The Army's needs a standardized training doctrine applicable throughout the force that addresses the range of army land operations based on the contemporary security environment.

### 3. Leadership Construct

a. "The battlefield challenge is to inspire soldiers to do things against their natural will, to carry out missions for the greater good of the unit, the Army, and the country."<sup>80</sup>

b. Leadership, as defined by FM 22-100, *Leadership* "is influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization".<sup>81</sup>

The Army leadership construct provides a foundation for the development of leaders of character and competence at the direct, organizational, and strategic level and provides points for leaders to consider when assessing and developing soldiers, and units to execute a broad range of tasks through a comprehensive operations construct and mission focused training construct.

c. The Army is a values based organization. The purpose of Army leadership doctrine is to define and focus those values.

d. Leadership is the dynamic that "focuses" the capabilities inherent in the relationship between the operations, leadership, and training

constructs and through METL training, to produce units capable of executing their within the mission environment.

### *Recommendations*

Through an analysis of the operations, training and leadership constructs the following recommendations are made:

1. A change in the operations construct will require a review and if necessary a change in the training and leadership constructs to remain in balance.
2. The terms "battle focus" and Mission Essential Task List require a review to ensure that they account for the missions the Army conducts day to day in support of the National Military Strategy of engagement.
3. The leadership concepts proposed in FM 22-100, *Leadership* have been approved as Army doctrine. A strategy is now required to implement to nurture and develop leaders that are agile and able to react to a complex and ambiguous environment.

### *Conclusion*

FM 100-5, Operations must capture and explain the dynamic interaction between its operations, training and leadership constructs in such a way that Army forces can rapidly respond to any mission tasking. Army doctrine should expressively clarify the dynamics between operations, training, and leadership ensuring a clear understanding that when one construct shifts, the others must also shift in balance for comprehensive mission success. The Army's operations

construct must be relevant to our nation's strategic policies. This requires an agile force that can seamlessly shift between military actions with little time for preparation. It requires leaders who understand the dynamism and key linkages between the operations, training, and leadership constructs and can focus the training of the army for mission execution. Such an understanding and focus will maintain the Army as a trained and ready force capable of responding to the needs of the nation.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Concept Paper 1, *The Doctrinal focus of FM 100-5, Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1999), pg 1, Hereinafter, Concept Paper 1.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-1, *The Army*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Jun, 1994), pg ii, Hereinafter, FM 100-1.

<sup>4</sup>Concept Paper 5, *The Dynamic Relationship between the Army's Operational, Training, and Leadership Constructs*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1999), pg 1, Hereinafter, Concept Paper 5.

<sup>5</sup>USA Command and General Staff College, *Notes from the FM 100-5 Strategy Session with General Abrams*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Feb 1999

<sup>6</sup>National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, *1998 Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power for Peace*, editor in chief Hans Binnendijk, (Washington, D.C.: 1998), pg 1, Hereinafter, 1998 Strategic Assessment .

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Department of Defense, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, D.C.: May 1997), pg 4, Section II, hereinafter, QDR.

<sup>10</sup>Office of the President, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington, D.C.: October 1998), pg 6-7, hereinafter, NSS.

<sup>11</sup>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States*, (Washington, D.C: September 1997), pg 12-19.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid, pg 21-22.

<sup>13</sup>U.S. Code, Title 10, section 3062, *Armed Forces*.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.



<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-1, *The Army*. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Jun, 1994), pg v, Hereinafter, FM 100-1.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid, pg iv.

<sup>22</sup>Gordon R. Sullivan, *The Collected Works of the Thirty Second Chief of Staff, US Army: June 1991-June 1995*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1995), pg 206.

<sup>23</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Nov 1988), pg 1-1, Hereinafter, FM 25-100.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid, pg i.

<sup>25</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Jun, 1993), pg 2-0, Hereinafter, FM 100-5.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid, pg 2-2

<sup>27</sup>FM 25-100, pg 1-3.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid, pg 1-4.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid, pg 1-5.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid, pg 2-1.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid, pg 3-1.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid, pg 4-1.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid, pg 5-1.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, DRAG version, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Nov 1998), pg 1-17, Hereinafter, FM 22-100.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid, pg 1.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid, pg 1-2.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid, pg 1.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, TRADOC Pam 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*, (Fort Monroe, VA: 1 Aug 1994), pg 4-4, Hereinafter, TRADOC Pam 525-5.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

<sup>56</sup>FM 22-100, pg v.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid, pg 2-3.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid, pg 2-4.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid, pg 2-5.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid, pg 2-6.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid, pg 2-7.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid, pg 2-13.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid, pg 2-14.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid, pg 2-24.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid, pg 2-22.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid, pg 2-24.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid.

<sup>75</sup>1998 Strategic Assessment , pg 1.

<sup>76</sup>QDR, Section II, page 4.

<sup>77</sup>NSS, pg 6-7.

<sup>78</sup>FM 100-1, pg v.

<sup>79</sup>FM 25-100, pg i.

<sup>80</sup>FM 22-100, pg 1.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid, pg 1-2.

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